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ever, many governments are forsaking such tactics to focus on shorter-term quick
fixes. Whilst recognising that risks-sharing agreements represent an important
market access strategy, the objective of this research was to examine if the marked
expansion in number of risk-sharing agreements through 2007-2010 is still con-
tinuing, or if there is a gradual levelling off across the world.METHODS: Secondary
research was conducted examining reimbursement decisions around the world,
with a special focus on Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Russia, Spain, Turkey, UK
and United States. This was supplemented by primary research with payors and
organisations through interviews in native languages to identify potential risk-
sharing agreements outside the public domain as well as general opinions.
RESULTS: Thirty-two new risk-sharing agreements were found in the period of
review (May 2011 - May 2012), which is roughly in-line with the rate found in
previous years. The number of new drugs with risk-sharing agreements attached to
them actually declined, and most new agreements are being negotiated for drugs
which already have one in place. The majority of agreements tend to be finance-
based, although new performance-based agreements continue to emerge, includ-
ing in emerging markets. The majority continue to focus on the oncology arena.
CONCLUSIONS: Although risk-sharing continues to be a routine part of market
access in many countries, there appears to be a notable “levelling off” of the rapid
expansion of this strategy in previous years. This is relatively unsurprising as it
reaches a natural plateau, but still notable against the background of ongoing
global austerity.
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OBJECTIVES:As part of the process of updating the National List of Health Services
(NLHS) in Israel, both health-plans (‘payers’) and manufacturers provide estimates
on the expected number of patients that will utilize the drug. Currently, payers face
major financial consequences when actual drug utilization is significantly higher
than the allocated budget. We suggest a risk-sharing model that imposes a poten-
tial penalty on the two stakeholders; if the actual number of patients exceeds the
manufacturer’s prediction, the manufacturer will reimburse the payers by a rebate
rate of  from the deficit. In case of under-utilization, payers will refund the gov-
ernment at a rate of  from the surplus budget. Our study objective was to identify
the optimal early estimations of both ‘players’ prior to and after implementation of
the risk-sharing scheme. METHODS: Using a Game-Theoretic approach, in which
both players’ statements are considered simultaneously, we examined the impact
of risk-sharing within a given range of rebate proportions (, ), on players’ early
budget estimations. RESULTS: With no risk-sharing, manufacturers and health-
plans will choose to announce the smallest and highest number of patients, from
the cumulative distribution function of patients, respectively. When increasing “”
to be over 50%, manufacturers will announce a larger number and health-plans will
announce a lower number of patients than they would without risk-sharing, thus,
substantially decreasing the gap between their estimates. On the other hand, in-
creasing  changes players’ estimates only slightly. CONCLUSIONS: In reaction to
applying a substantial risk-sharing rebate “” on the manufacturer, both players
are expected to adjust their budget estimates towards an optimal equilibrium.
Since manufacturers do not benefit directly from the health-plans’ rebate to the
government, increasing  is a better vehicle for reaching the desired equilibrium
rather than increasing , as both players are substantially influenced by the man-
ufacturer’s rebate .
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OBJECTIVES: To evaluate whether risk sharing agreements (RSA) are utlilised by
health technology assessment (HTA) agencies over the world. Similarities and dif-
ferences between appraisals where an RSA is applied will be assessed across the
different agencies. METHODS: Nine select HTA agencies across the globe
(MOHTLC, NICE, PBAC, SMC, TLV, INESSS, CADTH, NCPE, and AWMSG) were
scanned to determine what type of RSAs were adopted for drug appraisals. Only
single technology appraisals published between 2010 and April 2012 were included
in the search. Comparisons were made between the agencies to determine
whether any common trends were present, particularly for appraisals on the same
drug. RESULTS: In total 100 HTAs (74 treatments) were identified that included an
RSA across the 9 agencies. The number of RSAs identified per agency was as fol-
lows: MOHTLC (24 HTAs), NICE (23), PBAC (15), SMC (14), TLV (10), INESSS (7),
CADTH (6), NCPE (4), and AWMSG (2). Overall there was very little consistency
between agencies as to which treatments included an RSA. For the very few treat-
ments with an RSA fwith more than one agency, the type of agreement applied
between these agencies varied. RSAs identified in NICE submissions were often
elaborate whilst the remaining agencies usually applied simple discounts, price
reductions or cost agreements. Interestingly, all recently submitted oncology ther-
apies to INESSS were required to have a shared financial risk agreement for
recommendation. CONCLUSIONS: RSAs are applied by several HTA agencies from
around the world. There does not seem to be consistency in RSAs amongst the
different agencies. If an RSA is made for a particular treatment for one agency, this
does not mean an RSA will be applied by another agency for the same treatment.
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Paediatric use marketing authorisation (PUMA) was developed by the European
Medicines Agency to promote the development of paediatric formulations of prod-
ucts that are already authorised but are no longer covered by intellectual property
rights (patent, supplementary protection certificate). There are a number of aims of
which 2 are of interest here: ensure that medicines used to treat children are
subject to high-quality, ethical research and are appropriately authorised; and
achieve these objectives without subjecting the paediatric population to unneces-
sary clinical trials and without delaying the authorisation for other patients. In
September 2011 BUCCOLAM® was the first product to receive a PUMA for the treat-
ment of prolonged, acute, convulsive seizures. Products approved in this way are
likely to have less comparative data which makes both Pharmacoeconomic value
demonstration and assessment more challenging. In order to undertake cost-ef-
fectiveness analyses for BUCCOLAM to inform HTAs, de novoprimary data gather-
ing was required. This included: gathering expert views on treatment pathways,
downstream consequences of seizures and utilities (utilising a Delphi process);
gathering information on treatment pathways and the frequency and locale of
seizures (patient/carer surveys); and a cost-gathering exercise with hospitals. The
SMC and AWMSG were willing to accept the data gathered above in combination
with extensive sensitivity analysis which addressed the economic uncertainties
resulting from the limited clinical trial data. In other countries, where reimburse-
ment is linked to the strength of efficacy evidence it can be very difficult for a PUMA
product to demonstrate value. The PUMA process is relatively new and it may be
necessary for HTA bodies to review their requirements for interventions licensed
via this regulatory process and prepare an alternative pathway to assess their
value. In many cases this approach has been taken for orphan and ultra-orphan
diseases where the same data challenges may apply.
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Medical tourism is commonly perceived and popularly depicted as an economic
issue, both at the system and individual levels. The decision to engage in medical
tourism, however, is more complex, driven by patients’ unmet need(s), the nature
of services sought and the manner by which treatment is accessed. In order to
harness and promote the opportunities medical tourism offers, as well as address
and contain attendant threats, an informed decision is crucial. This paper aims to
enhance the current knowledge on medical tourism by isolating the types of deci-
sions that patients make – and based on the existing literature, proposing a theo-
retical sequence in opting for or against medical care abroad. It proposes a sequen-
tial decision-making process to engage in medical tourism, which includes
considerations of the required treatments, location of treatment, and the quality
and safety issues that are attendant to seeking care. Where patient involvement is
regarded as crucial in achieving the desired health outcomes and promoting the
efficient use of resources, the active role of the patient under medical tourism
should prove to be valuable. In consideration of the challenges and opportunities
that medical tourism offers, bringing forward scholarship on the globalization of
health care in general and of medical tourism in particular, calls for developing
empirical evidence on this increasingly popular and complex form of accessing and
provision of medical care.
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OBJECTIVES: The purpose of this analysis was to evaluate drivers affecting market
access for new technologies in twenty established and emerging markets (Austra-
lia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, In-
dia, Japan, Norway, Poland, Russia, Spain, Turkey, the UK, Sweden, and
Switzerland). METHODS: Health care spend, government debt ratio, financing
structure and regulatory policy were examined relative to their impact on market
access. Comprehensive reviews of publicly available literature, data sources, poli-
cies and regulations were performed for each country of interest. RESULTS: En-
trants to markets without an official regulatory body face stiff competition from
non-standard or counterfeit comparator products. At the other extreme, some
countries require substantial country-specific clinical evidence for approval, mak-
ing them cost-prohibitive for smaller manufacturers . High government debt ratios
were found to be predictive of increased austerity measures, which broadly have a
negative impact on market access for new technologies, placing pressure on down-
ward pricing in countries that use national fee schedules. DRG-based systems were
found to be more receptive than markets that reimbursed inpatient facilities
through annual global payments. The likelihood of a medical device receiving an
HTA in any country is dependent on (1) regulatory requirements for market entry
and (2) the existence of device-focused HTAs, which are not as pervasive as HTAs
for pharmaceuticals. In countries where inpatient procedures are funded by global
payments, hospital level reviews are more likely than a national assessment for
medical device technologies. In countries where fee-for-service dominates device
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